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n the 1970s and early 1980s, James Keegstra, a high school teacher in Alberta,
Canada, tainted his instruction with antiSemitic ideas (Queen v. Keegstra, 713). He
taught his students that Jews were moneymongers, infant killers, and power seekers;
that they caused economic difficulties, wars,
and socialchaos; and that they manufactured
the Holocaust to garner sympathy. He required
his students to reflect his ideas on exams or
suffer low grades (714). In 1982, Keegstra was
prosecuted under Canada's criminal hate
speech provision (713). That provision
imposed liability on anyone "who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, willfully promote[d] hatred against
any identifiable group" (713, 715 (quoting
CriminalCode,RS.C., ch. C-46 (1985) (Can.))).
After being convicted, Keegstra appealed to
the Alberta Court of Appeal, arguing that the
hate speech provision violated the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Queen v.
Keegstra, 714), which recognizes freedom of
expression as a fundamental freedom
(Constitution Act 1982, § 2). When the Court of
Appeal accepted Keegstra's claim, the Crown
appealed (Queen v. Keegstra, 714). The
Canadian Supreme Court then set out to determine the constitutionality of Canada's hate
speech law. Based on an elaborate balancing
test, the Court concluded that the law was constitutional (795). The Court thus upheld a criminal limitation on Keegstra's freedom of
expression.
In a similar case two years later, the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a hate
speech ordinance because it violated the First
Amendment (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
Minnesota 1992, 377). The petitioner (the party
bringing the appeal) in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,
Minnesotahad allegedly burned a cross on a
black family's lawn and had been prosecuted
under St. Paul, Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance (380). The ordinance criminalized
placing "on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or
graffiti . . . which one knows or has reason to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender" (380 (quoting St. Paul BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul,
Minnesota, Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990))).

I
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Petitioner claimed that the ordinance itself, not
simply the way it was applied, violated the
First Amendment. While the trial court accepted the petitioner's claim, the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate limitation on fighting words (R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 380), which Chaplins(cy
v. New
Hampshirehad defined as words that "by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace" (Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire 1942, 572). The United States
Supreme Court concluded, however, that the
ordinance, though applicable only to fighting
words, was an unconstitutional content-based
infringement on First .Amendment rights
(RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 383-85). The Court
thus protected a petitioner's freedom of speech
rights and reached a result different from that
of the Canadian Supreme Court.
This paper seeks to better understand the
Canadian Supreme Court's approach to limitations on free speech. The paper a~opts a limited comparative perspective; that is, it uses the
United States' s approach to free speech limita-

Canadausesa balancingapproachthat locates
free speechrightsand limitationsin the same
source-the valuesof a free and democratic
society-and thus is morewillingto limit
individualfree speechrightsin favor of social
interests.
tions as found in R.A. V. as a reference point to
illustrate how the Canadian approach has been
more amenable to limitations on free speech.
To that end, section one outlines the tests that
the United States and Canadian Supreme
Courts used in determining whether the hate
speech regulations they addressed were constitutional. Section one first describes how the
United States protects individual speech rights
by limiting content-based regulation even of
speech that under the Constitution may be proscribed. Section one also notes how Canada
uses a balancing approach that locates free
speech rights and limitations in the same
source--the values of a free and democratic
society-and thus is more willing to limit
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individual free speech rights in favor of social
interests. Section two then suggests four reasons why the Canadian Court may have adopted a test more agreeable to limiting freedom of
expression: namely, the text of the Canadian
Charterof Rightsand Freedoms,Canada's historical experience in protecting fundamental
rights, the harms the Canadian court considered in balancing individual and social interests, and Canada's international legal obligations. Section two does not
purport to survey
all influences that
may have led the
Canadian Supreme
Court to its more
restrictive
approach, nor does
the section pretend
to prove that the
Court was affected
by the reasons
offered. Instead,
section two recognizes the difficulty
of proving influence on the court
and merely explores factors possibly affecting the
court's decision.

----

I. The Courts' Analyses
The U.S.Approach
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the United
States Supreme Court adopted the rule that
"content-based regulation[-regulation
outlawing specific material-is] presumptively
invalid" (382), because it raises "the specter
that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace"
(387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Board.
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))). The Court recognized, however, that the prohibition against
regulations outlawing specific content is not
absolute. Indeed, content-based restriction is
allowed "in a few limited areas, which are 'of
such slight value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clear-36-

ly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality"' (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 38283 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
1942, 572)).
In determining whether content-based regulation will be allowed, the court applies what
Cass Sunstein characterizes as a two-tier
approach (8-9). The court first categorizes
speech as either speech that may be proscribed
or as speech that ordinarily may not be prhibited. Proscribable speech is apparently identified through a balancing effort that
weighs the questioned speech's
usefulness in determinin g truth
against the social
interest in order
and
morality
(Queen v. Keegstra,
742). This balancing
has identified
defamation,
obscenity, and fighting words as types
of speech that may
be proscribed
(R.A.V.v. City of St.
Paul, 383). Speech
about
political
issues, by contrast, ordinarily may not be prohibited, though the boundaries and means of
delineating speech that normally may not be
proscribed are unclear (Sunstein, 9).
Once the court categorizes a type of
speech, the presumptive ban against contentbased regulation is applied. For both types of
speech, the ban may be overcome when regulation of content is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Application of the ban
thus involves a second balancing-a balancing
of state interests and individual speech rights.
For proscribable speech, however, the ban
against content-based regulation may be overcome in four additional situations: first,
"[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable,
no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists" (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
388); second, when the proscribed content is
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"associated with particular 'secondary effects'
. . . so that the regulation is 'justifiedwithout
reference to the content of the . . . speech"'
(R.A.V.v. City of St Paul, 389 (quoting Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(quoting with emphasis Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))));third,
when the regulation outlaws conduct in a way
that incidentally limits "a particular contentbased subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech" (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 389); and
fourth, when other regulatory reasons exist
that do not constitute state suppression of
ideas (390).To justify content-based regulation
under this fourth situation "(where totally proscribable speech is at issue) it may not even be
necessary to identify any particular 'neutral'
basis, so long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot" (390).It is thus easier to sustain contentbased regulation of proscribable speech than of
ordinarily nonproscribable speech.
The surprising feature of the American
decision is that content-based regulation of
proscribable speech is limited at all. This result
stands in marked contrast to the Canadian
approach to speech regulation. Both countries
use some type of balancing (in spite of the fact
that the First Amendment guarantee appears
categorical) as the review of the Canadian
court's analysis will soon reveal. Yet, the two
countries reach divergent conclusions: the
United States upholds individual free speech
rights even when proscribable speech is
involved, while Canada attempts to eliminate
the harmscaused by hate speech by permitting
its criminalization.

The CanadianApproach
The Canadian Supreme Court employs a
two-phase analysis, characterized by balancing, to assess the constitutionality of speech
restrictions. The first step of the Canadian
Supreme Court's analysis is the Irwin Toytest,
which is used to determine whether a law violates the Canadian Charter's free expression
guarantee (Queen v. Keegstra, 728). Under the
Irwin Toytest, the court makes two inquiries.
First, it asks "whether the activity [being pro-
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hibited by the statute] ... falls within the
protected" sphere of freedom of expression
(729). "If the activity [being prohibited] conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has
expressive content and [therefore] ... falls
within the scope of the guarantee' ... irrespective of the particular meaning . . .
sought to be conveyed" (729 (quoting Irwin
Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General). [1989]
1 S.C.R. 927, 969)). Thus, as under the
American analysis, freedom of expression is
broadly protected, at least initially.
If the court determines that the prohibited
activity falls within the scope of the free
expression guarantee, the court performs the
second inquiry, asking "whether the purpose
of the impugned government action is to
restrict freedom of expression" (Queen v.
Keegstra, 729). If the government action
restricts an expressive activity, the Charter's
free expression guarantee is not violated (729),
unless it is shown "that the activity supports
rather than undermines the principles and values upon which freedom of expression is
based" (730). Consequently, the government
can restrict activities at the periphery of free
expression values as long as it does so incidentally and not purposefully. This standard
opens the door for speech limitations.
The second phase of the Canadian analysis
involves a balancing that further accommodates limitations of expression. Labeled the
Oakes test (735), this second phase seeks to
determine "whether a limit on a right or freedom can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society" under section 1 of the
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms(73435). The Oakes test itself has two prongs. The
first prong requires that the governmental limit
on free speech "[have] an objective of pressing
and substantial concern in a free and democratic society" (735). This prong gives great
weight to the needs of Canadian society. In
Keegstra,
for example, the hate speech provision
was found to have a pressing social purpose, in
part because the provision Wal:!adopted in
response to studies indicating that "hate propaganda . . . was not insignificant" in
Canada (745) and because hate propaganda
threatened grave individual and social injury
(745-48). Thus, while the R.A. V. Court gave
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to uphold a statute even though less restrictive
options exist.
Third, the effect of the act must be proportional to its objective (735). Regulation cannot
"present so grave a limitation upon [a Charter}
guarantee . . . as to outweigh the benefits to
be gained from [the] measure" (786).Under the
proportionality inquiry, as under the minimal
impairment analysis, the relation of the expression in question to "the values underlying the
guarantee of freedom of speech" apparently
influences the weight the expression is given
(787). The less closely related the expression is
to the values underlying free speech, the more
likely the infringement will be held proportionaltotheinfring~
ment's objective.
While it is impossibletopinpoint why Canadaadopteda morespeechIf a governmental
act survives
restricuveapproach,four reasonsseemplausible:the constitutionaltext
both prongs of the
.whichguided the Court'sinquiry,Canada'shistoricaltreatmentof
Oakes test, "the infringement [on] ...
fundamental rights,the harmsthe Ca_1_1fJ!,lian
Courtconsideredin
freedom of exprespeiformingits balancing,and Canada'sinternationallegalobligations.sion as guaranteed by
[the Charter is] up---------------------------------------------------------------held as a reasonable
limit prescribed by law in a free and democratobjective (735). If an act does not further its
objective, it is deemed irrational and fails this
ic society" (787). The Oakes test leaves ample
requirement .
room for such reasonable limits. Not only does
Second, the means chosen for achieving
the test mandate a balancing of freedom of
the objective should minimally impair the conexpression against other concerns, but the test
stitutional freedom or right (735). While this
operates on the assumption that both the guarminimal impairment language would seem to
antees and the limits of Charterrights and freeallow only restrictions that can be characterdoms flow from "[t]he underlying values of a
free and democratic society'' (736). By holding
ized as necessary, in fact the requirement is less
that these values form the foundation for
stringent. The requirement does "not operate
in every instance so as to force the government
Charterguarantees, as well as for the limits on
to rely upon only the mode of intervention
those guarantees, the test establishes social
least intrusive of a Charterright or freedom"
needs and values as the standard for identify(784). The government may choose "a more
ing and limiting rights. As a result, individual
restrictive measure, either alone or as part of a
rights are deprived of independent value. They
larger programme of action, if that measure is
are accorded weight only to the degree they
not redundant, furthering the objective in ways
correspond to and support social values. Depriving individual rights of autonomous prothat alternative responses could not, and is in
all other respects proportionate to a valid" aim
tection provides the Court significant leeway to
of the CanadianCharter,section 1 (785). Thus,
limit such rights. Thus, the KeegstraCourt
while the United States Supreme Court
found the prohibited speech "not closely linked
requires that content-based regulation be necto the rationale underlying" the free expression
essary to achieve a compelling state interest,
guarantee and consequently proscribable (762),
in contrast to the Court in R.A. V.
the Canadian Supreme Court appears willing

little weight to the negative effects of hate
speech as a justification for content-based
restriction, Canada's Keegstraanalysis cast
individual and social harm as a compelling
counterweight to freedom of speech.
The Canadian analysis also balances the
individual and social interests in free speech
under the second prong of the Oakes test. The
second prong requires "proportionality
between the objective"and the governmental
action in question (735). To fulfill this proportionality requirement, governmental action
must satisfy three additional requirements.
First, there must be a rational ·connection
between the means chosen and the legislative
----------------------------------------------------------------
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However, lest it appear from the cases analyzed that the Canadian and American
approaches to criminal speech regulation are
more divergent than they actually are, it
should be noted here that the United States
Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the
St. Paul ordinance, but held that it was invalid
on its face because it was unconstitutionally
content-based (Sajo 1995). Like Canada, the
United States has in fact been willing to sustain
criminalization of certain speech, such as the
counseling of murder, under the First
Amendment (Sajo; Greenawalt 1989, 191).
Moreover, the United States has not adopted a
single approach for addressing speech regulation; hence, the R.A.V. case does not provide a
complete picture of the extent to which the
United States will sustain free speech limitations. Nevertheless, as the above descriptions
of the American and Canadian approaches to
hate speech reveal, the Canadian court has
been more willing than the U.S. court to limit
free expression, at le~t µ1 this nan:ow arena.

II. PossibleReasonsfor
Canada'sRelativeWillingness
to Limit FreeSpeech
While it is impossible to pinpoint why
Canada adopted a more speech-restrictive
approach, four reasons seem plausible: the
constitutional text that guided the court's
inquiry, Canada's historical treatment of fundamental rights, the harms the Canadian court
considered in performing its balancing, and
Canada's international legal obligations. This
paper now turns to an exploration of these
influences.

The Textof the CanadianCharter
of Rightsand Freedoms
While America's
First Amendment
expresses a facially absolute prohibition
against governmental infringement on free
speech, the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedomscontains a free expression guarantee
that may be limited and even ignored by the

federal and provincial governments. Section 2
of the Charterguarantees that "[e]veryone has
the following fundamental freedoms: . . .
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression" (Constitution Act 1982, § 2). Section 1,
however, provides that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charterare subject "to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"(§ 1). Section 1 confines infringements on free expression to those that are reasonable and demonstrably justifiable, yet it
clearly accommodates limits. The Canadian
court in Keegstratherefore began from a position that presupposed the possibility of governmental infringements on individual free
expression. Beginning from such a position, it
is unstartling that the court was willing to sustain some speech limitations. This is not to suggest that it is surprising that the U.S. court has
upheld free speech limitations under a facially
unconditional bar against speech regulation,
but only to suggest that it is easier to sustain
restrictions when the possibility of limits is
expressly recognized by the very document
that guarantees the right.
Not only does the CanadianCharterpermit
limits on Charterfreedoms, under section 33 it
authorizes "Parliament or the legislature of a
province[, within certain limits, to] expressly
declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature . . . that the Act or ·a provision thereof
shall operate notwithstanding [the guarantees]
included in section 2" (§ 33). Section 33 did not
apply in Keegstraas the hate speech provision
in question was not expressly exempt from the
reach of section 2. Yet the section may have
influenced the Keegstra court. The section
seems to constitutionalize the notion that legislatures are supreme and can even proscribe
individual rights in the exercise of their sovereignty (Marx 1982, 71). The mere presence of
the provision in the Canadian Constitution,
regardless of its immediate relevance to the
case at hand, may have led the court to defer to
the legislature. In sum, the Charter'stextual
recognition of legislative supremacy and of the
proscribability of fundamental rights may well
have contributed to the court's willingness to
uphold free expression limitations.

-39-
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Canada'sHistoricalTreatment
of FundamentalRights
In pursuing its more speech-restrictive
approach, the Canadian court may also have
been influenced by Canada's historical treatment of fundamental freedoms which reveals
only recent recognition of speech as an explicit
constitutional right, a lack of independent protection for fundamental rights, and an accep-

When claimsinvolvingfundamentalfreedoms
werebroughtbeforeCanadiancourtsunder the
BritishNorth AmericaAct of 1867, the courts
basisfor protectingthose
had no consti-tutional
rights.
tance of parliamentary supremacy over individual freedoms.
Canada's first constitutional document
was the British North America Act of 1867. The
BNA Act, later titled the Constitution Act, 1867
(Hogg 1985,4), sought to carry out the desire of
"the Pro.vinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and
New Brunswick . . . to be federally united
into One Dominion under the Crown of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
with a Constitution similar in Principle to tJ:tat
of the United Kingdom" (Constitution Act
1867, preamble). The act fulfilled two purposes: it "established the rules of federalism," allocating power between the federal Parliament
and the provincial legislatures (Hogg, 2), and it
gave Canada a constitution similar to that of
England. The act did not, however, attempt to
create a constitutional system of fundamental
freedoms for the dominion (2). Under the act's
federalist allocations, neither the federal nor
the provincial legislatures "were . . . intended to serve as the instruments for the protection of fundamental rights" (Cotler 1982, 126).
Instead, by prescribing for Canada a constitution similar to that of England, the act adopted
the English theory of parliamentary sovereignty, which meant that parliament was empowered to enact whatever laws it deemed necessary, including laws that limited fundamental
freedoms such as speech (129). The BNA Act

-40-

thus provided no guarantees for individual
rights and even recognized the constitutionality of legislative infringements.
As a result, when claims involving fundamental freedoms were brought before Canadian courts under the act, the courts had no constitutional basis for protecting those rights. The
courts could look only to principles of federalism and parliamentary supremacy expounded
by the act. Fundamental rights claims were
therefore often decided within the framework
of legal federalism (124). Legal federalism
assumed the supremacy of parliament (129)
and focused the courts, not on "limitations on
the exercise of [legislative] power," but on "the
division of powers between the federal and
provincial governments." When "federal or
provincial law appeared to offend . . . civil
liberties, the central question . . . became . .
. [whether] the alleged denial of civil liberties
[was] within the legislative power of the
offending government" (124). If the denial fit
within the power of the enacting government,
the denial was upheld (124).Only if the denial
fell outside the enacting legislature's authority
was the denial declared unconstitutional, not
because it limited an individual's fundamental
rights but because the legislation violated the
federalist division of authority.
For example, in UnionCollieryCo.v. Bryden
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
was presented with a provincial law that forbade employing Chinese individuals in subterranean coal mines (Cotler, 125 (citing Union
Colliery Co. Ltd. v. Bryden. [1899) A.C. 580
(P.C.))).The Judicial Committee found the act
unconstitutional but not because it was racially discriminatory. The act was unconstitutional
because it was without the legislative competence of the provincial legislature: the act dealt
with alien or non-naturalized citizens, and
matters of naturalization and alienism were
within the federal, not provincial domain
(Cotler, 125).
While the legal federalism analysis served
to protect individual rights in Bryden,the analysis led to affirmation of an infringement on
speech rights in Nova ScoHaBoardof Censorsv.
McNeil. In McNeil, a provincial censorship law
had been used to prevent exhibition of a film
(Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors and McNeil
1978, 1, 4-5). The Canadian Supreme Court
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upheld the law because it was "in pith and sublimited the Bill's effectiveness. The Bill was
enacted as a piece of federal legislation applicstance directed to property and civil rights" and
therefore lay within the provincial legislature's
able only to federal law and subject to amendauthority (2). Even the dissenting judge, Chief
ment through the normal legislative process
(Hogg, 639-40).In addition, instead of seizing
Justice Laskin, who recognized the infringement on individual rights "would have invaliupon the Bill's explicit guarantees, the
Canadian Supreme Court continued to neglect
dated the legislation on the grounds that it
fundamental freedom issues and was appar[was] 'within the exclusive power of the
Parliament of Canada under its enumerated
ently influenced by legal federalism in decidauthority to legislate in relation to the criminal
ing the validity of federal limits on individual
law,'" not on the grounds that it violated fundarights under the Bill (Cotler, 130-31). Conmental freedom (Cotler, 127 (quoting Re Nova
sequently, before the Charter was adopted,
Scotia Board of Censors and McNeil 1978,14)).
Canadian courts "[had] never really confront~
While the legal federalism analysis
ed the system of freedom of expression headon; nor [had] the courts grappled with the funappears to blatantly ignore the independent
damental value claims and collisions that have
weight of fundamental rights, the analysis may
dominated American case-law" (134).
in fact have been the only means of protecting
fundamental rights that would have been conCanada's pre-Charterconstitutional history
sistent with existing law (Cotler, 126).As menreveals first the relative recentness of Canada's
tioned, the BNA Act contained no explicit
explicit recognition of free speech as a fundaguarantee of fundamental rights; instead the
mental legal right, second the Supreme Court's
act incorporated the rule of parliamentary
reluctance to accord independent legal weight
supremacy with its notion that Parliament
to fundamental rights, and third the court's
could limit rights almost at will (126-27).As a
willingness to uphold infringements on free
result, the courts may have found legal federspeech rights by competent legislative acts.
alism to be the most appropriate or indeed the
While the Charter altered the constitutional
framework in which the KeegstraCourt operatonly means whereby they could respect the
BNA Act and its attendant principle of legislaed, the Charterdid not foreclose the influence
tive sovereignty while still providing some
of these historical trends. As noted, the rule of
protection for fundamental freedoms (127). parliamentary supremacy found its way into
Whether the courts-------------------------------were trying to protect
Canada's
pre-Charterconstimtionalhistoryreveals
first the relative
fundamental rights
or not, the reality recenmess
of Canada'sexplicitrecognitionoffree speechas a
remains that under
to
legal
federalism fundamental legalright,secondthe SupremeCourt'sreluctance
analysis fundamental accordindependentlegalweighttofundamental rights,and third the
rights lacked independent
weight. Court'swillingness
to upholdinfringementsonfree speechrightsby
Instead, rights were
acts.
viewed as clearly competentlegislative
proscribable by a leg- -------------------------------islature in the proper exercise of its constitusection 33 of the Charter and therefore
tional authority (129).
remained part of the constitutional landscape
In 1960 Canada adopted a bill of rights
in which Keegstrawas decided. Similarly, the
(Hogg, 639). The Canadian Bill of Rights
reluctance to give individual rights separate
"declared that in Canada there have existed
weight was consistent with the premise of secand shall continue to exist . . . the following
tion 1 that both guarantees and limits the values
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
of a democratic society. Because these historical
namely, ... freedom of speech" (Part I,§ 1).
practices were compatible with the Chartertext
However, the form and scope of the Bill, as
and because they had figured so prominently
well as the manner in which it was applied,
in Canada's constitutional experience, the
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court may well have been influenced by these
practices in assessing the constitutionality of
free speech regulation in Keegstra.

Canada'sInternationalLegal
Obligations

The Canadian court also appears influenced
by Canada's international legal obligaThe Harmsthe CanadianCourt
tions. Prior to Keegstra,Canada had committed
Considered
to prohibit certain types of hate speech under
two relevant treaties: the International
The Court may also have reached a more
Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which
speech-restrictive result because of the harms it
was "adopted by the United Nations in 1966
was willing to consider in balancing the indiand [has been] in force in Canada since 1976,"
vidual's free speech rights against the needs of
and the International Convention on the
Canadian society (Sajo). Again, comparison
Elimination
of All Forms of Racial
with the United States approach is revealing.
Discrimination, to which Canada was a signaUnited States free speech jurisprudence has
tory member and which has been "in. force
been heavily influenced by the Brandenburg since 1969" (Queen v. Keegstra, 751). The
clear-and-present-danger
test (Greenawalt,
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes
188), which maintains "that the constitutional
on its signatories the obligation to outlaw "any
guarantees of free speech and free press do not
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
permit a State to . . . proscribe advocacy of
hostility or violence" (U.S. Department of State
the use of force or of law violation except
1994, International Covenant art. 20). Similarly,
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
the International
Convention
on the
producing imminent lawless action and is ,li.keElimination
of
All
Forms
of
Racial
ly to incite or produce such action"
Discrimination
binds
states'
parties
to
(Brandenburg v. Ohio 1969, 447). The clearand-present-danger
paradigm permits the
declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination
of ideas based on racial supericourt to sustain proscription of certain speech
ority
or
hatred,
incitement to racial discrimonly when immediate harms might otherwise
ination, as well as all acts of violence or
result .
incitement to such acts against any race or
In contrast, the Canadian balancing congroup of persons of another colour or ethnic
origin, and also the provision of any assissiders long-term harm. For example, in assesstance
to racist activities, including the
ing whether a pressing legislative objective
financing thereof. (U.N. 1970, art. 4, CJ[a)
supported Keegstra'scriminal hate speech provision, the Canadian court was heavily influGiven the obligations imposed by both treaties,
the Canadian court found that Canada was not
enced by the fact that hate propaganda threatonly permitted but expected to prohibit ''hateens "the self-dignity of target group members"
promoting
expression" as part of its "guaranand may result in the acceptance of "prejutee
of
human
rights" (Queen v. Keegstra, 754).
diced messages . . . with the attendant result
By
contrast,
when R.A. V. was decided, the
of discrimination, and perhaps even violence,
United
States
was
a party to neither of these
against minority groups in [Canada]" (Queen
treaties
(Sajo).
Thus,
the United States was not
v. Keegstra, 748). Because the Canadian Court
obligated to prohibit any form of hate speech.
broadly considers long-term social harm, as it
Since the time of R.A.V., the United States has
did in Keegstra,social interests are more likely
ratified the International Covenant on Civil
to outweigh individual rights under the
and Political Rights; the covenant "entered
Canadian analysis than under the U.S.
into force ...
for the United
States
approach, which concentrates on 'the narrower
September 8, 1992" (U.S. Department of State
category of immediate harms. Canada's more
in Force350). Yet the United States
1994, Treaties
expansive view of constitutionally relevant
ratified the covenant subject to a significant
harm appears to be a third factor influencing the
reservation: ''That Article 20 [the article requircourt to uphold limits on freeexpression (Sajo).
ing prohibition of certain forms of hate speech]
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does not authorize or require legislation or
other action by the United States that would
restrict the right of free speech and association
protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States" (U.S. Congress 1992, 1(1)).U.S.
ratification was subject to other reservations,
understandings, and declarations that likewise
diminish the United States's obligations under
the covenant. For example, "Articles 1 through
27 of the covenant are not self-executing" in
the United States (111(1)).The effect, if any, of
the United States's qualified ratification of the
covenant has yet to be determined (Sajo),
though the Initial Report of the United States
to the U.N. Human Rights Committee indicates that prohibition of some but not all
"types of expression inciting discrimination,
hostility or violence" -as may be required
under article 20-would be "[im)permissible
under the U.S. Constitution" and so could not
be upheld in spite of the United States's ratification of the covenant (U.S. Department of
State 1994, Civil and PoliticalRights 160). The
effect of Canada's ratification of the covenant
and convention, on the other hand, was made
clear by the KeegstraCourt: Canada's treaty
obligations support restriction of hate speech
(Queen v. Keegstra, 754) and provide another
plausible reason why the Canadian Court was
more willing than the U.S. Supreme Court to
limit freedom of expression.

Conclusion
While it is impossible to identify with certainty the cause of the Canadian Supreme
Court's relative willingness to sustain limitations on free speech, highly tenable reasons
may be found in Canada's Charterof Rights and
Freedoms, which recognizes the power of
Canadian legislatures to limit and override the
Charter'sfree expression guarantee; Canada's
historical treatment of fundamental freedoms,
which included practices and perspectives
amenable to speech limitations; Canada's consideration of long-range harms in balancing
social needs against individual rights; and
Canada's international obligation to proscribe
hate propaganda. These reasons may well
have led the Canadian Supreme Court in
Keegstra, in contrast to the United States
Supreme Court in R.A. V., to conclude that the
criminalization of hate speech was a "reasonable limit . . . demonstrably justified in
[Canada's] free and · democratic sodety 11 ·
(Constitution Act 1982, § 1).
·
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